Analysis of the Effects of Article 53 of the Gabonese Constitution on

Introduction :

Article 53 of the Gabonese Constitution establishes strict criteria for eligibility for the presidency, including requirements of nationality, residency, and language skills. While these criteria appear neutral at first glance, closer analysis reveals that their effects may favor certain ethnic groups over others, which could have significant implications for national cohesion.

1. The strict nationality criterion: an implicit obstacle?

Article 53 requires presidential candidates to have parents who are Gabonese by birth or naturalized, and a spouse who is also of Gabonese nationality. This criterion, although neutral in its wording, tends to advantage groups such as the Fang , due to their endogamy and dominant presence in Gabon ( IndexMundi - Country Facts ). Smaller groups, such as the Pygmies or the Kota , are proportionally more affected by this requirement.

2. Continuous residence: a way to lock in power?

The requirement of continuous residence in Gabon for three years before the election seems reasonable, but it favors majority ethnic groups, such as the Fang , who reside mainly in strategic urban areas such as Libreville(

Other groups , with larger diasporas or living in rural areas or abroad, are indirectly excluded from being eligible for the presidency.

3. Local language: a symbolic but excluding criterion?

The requirement to speak a local language may seem innocuous, but it reflects a form of cultural heritage that favors certain ethnic groups. The Fang , who speak one of the most widespread local languages in Gabon, are de facto advantaged by this criterion, while smaller groups or those with members in the diaspora are more likely not to meet this requirement.

4. Potential implications for other positions of power

Article 53, although focused on eligibility for the presidency, could have broader repercussions on access to other key positions of power. The constitutional framework and the example given at the highest level of the State can influence practices in the process of nomination or election to positions such as those of deputies , senators , governors , and mayors .

The same dynamics observed in presidential eligibility could be replicated in how candidacies are structured or favored for these positions. For example, if rigid criteria regarding nationality and residency exclude groups, this could lead to disproportionate representation of certain groups in legislative and local bodies.

In addition, access to public service positions (particularly in regional administrations and large state-owned enterprises) could also be influenced. Historically, in many countries, when one ethnic group dominates the presidency, this can lead to an unequal distribution of positions of power at all levels of government.

5. Awarding of public contracts: concentration of wealth and economic domination

Regarding the awarding of public contracts , these contracts are crucial for the economic development of local businesses and for access to important economic resources. If one ethnic group dominates decision-making positions in key sectors of government, this could also lead to a concentration of public contracts in the hands of this group, favoring its economic interests to the detriment of other ethnicities.

In Gabon, public procurement is a strategic economic driver for business and regional development. If there is a correlation between the concentration of public positions and the allocation of contracts, this could have a profound impact on the distribution of wealth in the country.

6. Consequences for national cohesion

African history shows that when a single ethnic group seizes the levers of power, it often leads to deep tensions and divisions. This scenario recalls some dark periods in the continent’s history, where the domination of one group over others led to conflict, revolts, and a weakening of the nations concerned. The current dynamic, encouraged by the criteria of Article 53, could accentuate this fracture if it is not balanced by more inclusive policies.

Probability of election of a Fang with Article 53

The Fang , representing 23.2% of the population, mechanically have a higher chance of being eligible for the presidency based on the demographic distribution. They would have about 2.3 chances out of 10 of accessing the presidency, but the criteria of Article 53, by eliminating a part of the other ethnic groups, increases this probability to 7 chances out of 10 (or 70%), which represents a structural imbalance ( IndexMundi - Country Facts ).

Conclusion

Article 53 of the Constitution, although formulated in neutral terms, appears to create conditions that favour certain ethnic groups, particularly the Fang , to the detriment of other groups. This concentration of power, if it extends to other areas (governorships, deputies, civil servants, public procurement), could affect the national balance and recall certain troubled periods in African history, when one ethnic group dominated the others, leading to internal conflicts and divisions. To preserve national cohesion, it would be crucial to reexamine these criteria and ensure that they promote the inclusion of all components of Gabonese society.